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Background: Clinical studies and mathematical simulation suggest that active surveillance with contact isolation is
associated with reduced vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) prevalence compared to passive surveillance. Models
using pre- and post-intervention data that account for the imperfect observation and serial dependence of VRE
transmission events can better estimate the effectiveness of active surveillance and subsequent contact isolation;
however, such analyses have not been performed.
Methods: A mathematical model was fitted to surveillance data collected pre- and post-implementation of active
surveillance with contact isolation in the haematology-oncology ward. We developed a Hidden Markov Model to
describe undetected and observed VRE colonisation/infection status based on the detection activities in the ward.
Bayesian inference was used to estimate transmission rates. The effectiveness of active surveillance was assumed to be
via increased detection and subsequent contact isolation of VRE positive patients.
Results: We estimated that 31% (95% credible interval: 0.33–85%) of the VRE transmissions were due to cross-
transmission between patients. The ratio of transmission rates from patients with contact isolation versus
those without contact isolation was 0.33 (95% credible interval: 0.050–1.22).
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Conclusions: The majority of the VRE acquisitions in the haematology-oncology ward was estimated to be
due to background rates of VRE, rather than within ward patient to patient acquisition. The credible interval
for cross-transmission was wide which results in a large degree of uncertainty in the estimates. Factors that
could account for background VRE acquisition include endogenous acquisition from antibiotic selection
pressure and VRE in the environment. Contact isolation was not significantly associated with reduced VRE
transmission in settings where the majority of VRE acquisition was due to background acquisition, emphasising the
need to identify and address the source of acquisition. As the credible interval for the ratio of VRE transmission in
contact isolated versus non-contact isolated patients crossed 1, there is a probability that the transmission rate in
contact isolation was not lower. Our finding highlights the need to optimise infection control measures other than
active surveillance for VRE and subsequent contact isolation to reduce VRE transmission. Such measures could include
antimicrobial stewardship, environmental cleaning, and hand hygiene.
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Mathematical modellingBackground
The isolation of vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE)
in patients has become increasingly common [1]. Pa-
tients admitted to the haematology-oncology ward are at
high risk of VRE colonisation and infection [2], and VRE
colonised patients are at greater risk of VRE infections
[3]. These infections, such as VRE bacteraemia, are asso-
ciated with increased mortality and hospitalisation cost
[4, 5]. Accordingly, emphasis has been placed on pre-
venting VRE transmission between patients via infection
control programs [6].
Active surveillance and subsequent contact isolation
has been associated with reduction in VRE transmission
in some settings [7–10]. These clinical studies based on
observed data had assumed statistical independence in
their analysis. Importantly, this assumption may not be
true because the probability of a susceptible individual
becoming VRE colonised or infected is dependent on
the number of VRE colonised or infected patients at a
prior time [11]. Whilst published mathematical simula-
tion models describing VRE transmission have provided
an understanding of factors that influence VRE transmis-
sion in the hospital and outbreak setting [12–18], these
studies have not validated their estimated effectiveness
with post-intervention surveillance data. Indeed, existing
studies on the impact of active surveillance with subse-
quent contact isolation [7–10, 12, 14] also did not ac-
count for unobserved VRE transmission during the
passive surveillance period, an issue that can be ad-
dressed with Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) or latent
state variable models [19]. While the use of statistical
methods that account for undetected transmission and
dependencies in serial incidence data have been strongly
recommended [20, 21], studies of this kind are rare. An
extension of the transmission models currently in the lit-
erature [18, 19] is required. Thus, to account for un-
detected VRE transmission during passive surveillanceand statistical dependencies, we employed HMMs and
Bayesian inference to estimate the effectiveness of active
surveillance with contact isolation in reducing VRE
transmission.Methods
Patients and setting
This study was approved by the ethics committees of
Monash University and The Alfred. Data were collected
for patients admitted to the haematology-oncology ward
of The Alfred, a major tertiary teaching hospital in Mel-
bourne, Victoria, Australia. The ward has 32 beds for pa-
tients with hematological and solid organ malignancies,
including allogeneic and autologous bone marrow trans-
plantation. Part of the data on the impact of chlorhexi-
dine skin cleansing on the incidence of VRE colonisation
in haematology-oncology patients has been published
[22]. The data from the published study [22] corre-
sponds to the active surveillance with contact isolation
and active surveillance with contact isolation and chlor-
hexidine body cleansing phases of this study. The previ-
ous report which only included those who had negative
rectal swabs on admission as incident VRE cases, found
that chlorhexidine skin cleansing was not significantly
associated with reduced rate of VRE colonisation but did
not account for unobserved VRE transmission and stat-
istical dependencies in the dataset.Description of study phases
The study had 3 phases. Data on passive surveillance
only was collected for 5 months (21 October 2009 to 21
March 2010). This was followed by active surveillance
with contact isolation for 4 months (22 March to 31
June 2010). Following that, in addition to active surveil-
lance with contact isolation, non-rinse chlorhexidine
body cleansing using 2% chlorhexidine-impregnated
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October 2010).
Passive surveillance was the use of routine clinical cul-
tures (blood, sputum, urine) to identify VRE [6]. When a
positive clinical isolate for VRE was detected, all other
patients in the same ward were screened for VRE by rec-
tal swab. If a new VRE colonised patient who was not
previously in contact isolation was identified, surveil-
lance on all potential contacts continued until no further
patients were identified with positive VRE rectal swabs.
All patients who tested positive for VRE were isolated in
single rooms with dedicated bathrooms. As part of rou-
tine patient care, the use of gloves, but not gowns, was
strongly recommended for these patients and signs were
placed on doors notifying staff of isolation requirements.
Gowns were only required if contact with body fluids
was anticipated.
Active surveillance involved routine rectal swabs for
the presence of VRE on all new admissions to the
haematology-oncology ward, weekly during hospital
stay, and at discharge. Rectal swabs were taken either
by nursing staff or patients following instruction, and
plated for testing as described previously [22]. Patients
who were detected to be VRE positive were contact iso-
lated, as described for passive surveillance above. Dur-
ing the implementation of chlorhexidine skin cleansing,
all haematology-oncology patients were provided each
day with a pack containing four chlorhexidine wash-
cloths (Clinell Washcloths®, GAMA Healthcare Ltd.,
London, England) for self-application, as the only form
of bathing or after showering with soap and water and
drying. These washcloths were applied as described
previously [22].
Data
Microbiology, surveillance and census data for patients
admitted to the haematology-oncology ward were ob-
tained retrospectively from the microbiology, infection
control and clinical performance databases of the hos-
pital. Incident VRE cases were defined as VRE colonisa-
tion/infection in those who were negative on admission
and those with unknown VRE status on admission who
were detected as VRE positive during their stay in the
ward based on passive surveillance or active surveillance
(once-weekly VRE rectal swab). Including patients with
unknown VRE status on admission ensured a consistent
definition of newly-identified incident patients between
the active and passive surveillance study phases. This is
because in passive surveillance, rectal swabs were not
performed on admission, thus patients had unknown
VRE status on admission. The prevalence of VRE colo-
nised/infected patient for each day of the study was also
utilised in the mathematical model. Patients who were
known to be colonised with VRE on admission weredefined as those with previous history of VRE within the
last 30 weeks [23] and those that were positive within
48 h of admission into the ward. The data used in the
present study were the daily observed (detected) VRE in-
cidence and prevalence from 21 October 2009 to 28
October 2010 (Fig. 1). The data are available in the
Additional file 1.
Model structure
A mathematical model (Fig. 2) characterising VRE trans-
mission in the aforementioned strategies was developed
to fit the observed surveillance data. This enabled quan-
tification of the effect of active surveillance with or with-
out non-rinse chlorhexidine skin cleansing strategies on
VRE transmission. Our model was a modification of the
Kermack- McKendrick susceptible-infectious-removed
(SIR) model [24, 25] with patient migration and isolation
(partial removal) incorporated. The model assumed that
the haematology-oncology ward was of fixed size, N and
had 100% bed occupancy rate. Hence, the number of
uncolonised patients was N-C-D, where N was the total
number of patients in the ward, and C, D and U are the
numbers of hidden (not detected), detected (contact iso-
lated) VRE colonised/infected patients, and uncolonised
patients, respectively.
The probability (Pr) of the number of VRE colonised/
infected patients (i) changing in a small period of time
(h) is described by the following equations:
Pr Ctþh ¼ iþ 1 j Ct ¼ i½ 
¼ β0 þ β1 C tð Þ þ β2 D tð Þ
 
U tð Þ h;
ð1Þ
Pr Ctþh ¼ i−1 j Ct ¼ i½  ¼ μc C tð Þ½  h; ð2Þ
Pr Ctþh ¼ i j Ct ¼ i½  ¼ 1− Pr Ctþh ¼ i−1 j Ct ¼ i½ 
− Pr Ctþh ¼ iþ 1 j Ct ¼ i½ 
ð3Þ
An uncolonised patient may become VRE colonised/
infected by: (i) background acquisition (β0), which may
be associated with colonisation/infection from any
process that is independent of the number of VRE colo-
nised/infected patients (such as VRE already present on
admission and endogenous acquisition from antibiotic
selection pressure); (ii) transmission from VRE colo-
nised/infected, but not detected and isolated patients
(β1) and; (iii) transmission from VRE colonised/infected,
and detected and isolated patients (β2).
The time interval (h) was 1 day. To interpret these param-
eters from a clinical perspective, the mean number of days
required for one secondary colonisation per susceptible pa-
tient was calculated. The mean number of days to colonisa-
tion due to colonised/infected patient cross-transmission
for a susceptible patient was 1/[(β1
―
C ) + (β2
―
D )],
whereby ―C was the estimated number of hidden (not
Fig. 1 Daily observed (detected) VRE colonisation/infection incidence and prevalence
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the observed number of detected patients colonised/in-
fected with VRE. There are separate values of ―C and
―
D dur-
ing passive and active surveillance, respectively. The mean
number of days for one colonisation from background ac-
quisition (whether from antibiotic selection pressure or
cross-transmission from sources other than other colo-
nised/infected patients) for a susceptible patient was 1/ β0.
To estimate β2, we assumed that β1 would change by a
ratio of r where β2= r β1. The value of r was constrained
to be any value from 0 to 1.5, denoting that contact iso-
lation reduced transmission if estimated to be between 0
and 1 and increased transmission by no more than 1.5
times if estimated to be between 1 and 1.5. The values of
β1 and β2 were assumed to be unchanged when moving
from passive surveillance to active surveillance with con-
tact isolation. During the period of chlorhexidine skin
cleansing, β1 and β2 are replaced by β3 and β4, respect-
ively, to estimate the change in transmission for patients
who were cleaned with chlorhexidine washcloths. It wasassumed that β1 and β2 would change by a ratio of v,
whereby β3 = v β1 and β4 = v β2. Chlorhexidine skin
cleansing was assumed to have no impact on reducing
VRE colonisation and infection in haematology-oncology
patients and the value of v was assumed to be 1 in the
base-case model, based on the results of a non-
statistically significant reduction in VRE acquisition from
a previous study [22]. The value of v was varied in the
sensitivity analysis. The value of β0 was assumed to not
change between passive surveillance, active surveillance
and chlorhexidine skin cleansing.
The admission rates for U, C and D patients are αU, αC
and αD, respectively and discharge rate for U, C and D pa-
tients are μU, μC and μD, respectively (Fig. 2). Estimates of
these admission and discharge rates are not required as
we assumed a population of constant size (where the net
inflow of uncolonised patients equals the outflow of colo-
nised patients). Hence rather than estimating αU, αC and
αD, we only estimated the net change in U, C and D at
each time step. The discharge probability of detected VRE
Fig. 2 VRE transmission model. U = the number of patients who were not known to be colonised/infected (i.e. uncolonised); C = the number of
patients colonised/infected and not detected (and therefore not contact isolated); D = the number of patients who were detected (observed as
VRE colonised/infected) and contact isolated; αU, αC and αD are the admission rates for U, C and D patients, respectively, and μU, μC and μD are
the discharge rates for U, C and D patients, respectively. Pr U→ C = probability of VRE colonisation or infection in uncolonised patients. The
detection probability (λ) is expressed as the probability of being detected given that a patient is VRE colonised/infected
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reciprocal of the mean time from first identification of col-
onisation/infection to discharge (10.4 days). We assumed
the length of stay of the undetected patients, 1/μC, is the
same as for the detected patients, 1/μD.
Once detected as VRE colonized/infected, patients
were assumed to remain colonised for the duration of
their hospital stay and to contribute to the risk of VRE
transmission. This assumptions is justified, given the ob-
servation that duration of VRE carriage is considerably
longer than length of hospital stay [26]. The patient
population was assumed to be homogenous in terms of
susceptibility for colonisation [27], and homogenous
mixing of patients was assumed. VRE colonised and in-
fected patients were also assumed to contribute in the
same manner to colonisation pressure and thus risk of
VRE tranmission in the ward [11]. Contact isolation of
VRE-positive patients was assumed to commence on the
day of positive VRE culture. VRE acquisition pressure
due to antibiotic use was assumed to be identical for all
study phases, and was not part of the model.
Bayesian framework
All analyses were performed in MATLAB (Version
2015b, MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). A structured
HMM framework with transition and observation com-
ponents was used (Fig. 3). The HMM was used to gener-
ate a likelihood of the transmission parameters given the
observed data, integrated over the hidden states. This
likelihood was then used along with prior probabilities
to generate posterior probabilities for the model parame-
ters. Posterior distributions for the daily prevalence andincidence of colonised and infected patients (including
cryptic transmission) was also estimated. Hence we were
able to infer the underlying number of patients and
transmission rates [19, 27].
Observation model
The observation model describes the probability of VRE
detection based on the true (unobserved) prevalence of
VRE colonisation/infection for each of the three phases.
The Poisson distribution was used to describe the prob-
ability relationship between the observations and corre-
sponding hidden states. As detected incident patients
were contact isolated, at each observation, the detection
parameter (λ) describes the daily probability of detecting
an incident VRE colonised/infected patient. The model
assumed that for a given colonisation status, each pa-
tient has the same constant probability of being
detected. For passive surveillance only, the daily prob-
ability of detection is described by λ. During active sur-
veillance, λ is replaced by λ2, allowing for a different
detection probability. We assumed that during active
surveillance, the daily probability of a patient detected as
a new VRE case would increase. The increase in the
daily probability of a patient detected as a new VRE case
is denoted PD. The value of PD was assumed to be
based on the sensitivity of the VRE rectal swab. Litera-
ture review suggested that the sensitivity of VRE rectal
swab was estimated to be between 0.58 [28] and 0.97
[29]. As the rectal swab was only performed once a week
during active surveillance, the daily average increase in
detection per undetected VRE case was estimated based
on the average sensitivity of a VRE rectal swab divided
Fig. 3 Hidden Markov model. C = the estimated number of detected and undetected VRE colonised/infected patients in the underlying hidden
states at each time points (t = 1,2,3,….); D = the number of patients detected as VRE colonised/infected. The transition model linking the hidden
states are represented by the horizontal lines, whereas the observation model linking the hidden states and the corresponding observed data are
represented by the vertical lines. The probability of observing d new infections on day t, d(t) is assumed to be a Poisson distribution given by
d(t)~ Poisson (λ). Each day, the hidden states were updated based on observed new acquisitions, admissions and discharges from the dataset,
and also via the transition probabilities in Eqs. (1) to (3)
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The daily probability of detecting a new VRE case during
active surveillance (λ2) is equal to this active case detection
probability plus the probability that active case detection
does not occur but passive case detection occurs. That is
the daily probability of detection per undetected VRE case
during active surveillance (λ2) = PD + (1- PD)(λ). The value
of PD was varied in the sensitivity analysis.
Transition model
The hidden state transition component of the HMM is
given in Fig. 3. Hidden patients include those that are
not detected but are colonised/infected with VRE. Esti-
mates of transmission parameters were made using the
likelihood as per Baum’s recursion algorithm and Bayes-
ian inference tools described below.
The effectiveness of active surveillance in preventing VRE
transmission was assumed to act via increased detection,
leading to transition into isolation (D). Unknown parameter
values were estimated within a Bayesian framework using a
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm [30]. In the
MCMC estimation, θ = {β0, β1, β2, λ} was the vector of the
model parameters. The likelihood of the observed data, Y, is
given by determining the joint likelihood of the observations
and the hidden states, X, Pr (Y|θ, X) Pr(X|θ), summed over
all possible hidden states. This was determined using Baum’s
recursion algorithm (Additional file 2) [31]. The posterior
probability distributions of the transmission parameters β0,
β1, β2, and λ were estimated using MCMC algorithms
(Additional file 3). Markov chain convergence was assessed
via visual analysis of trace plots [32] and calculation of the
Gelman-Rubin convergence statistic [33].
The expected number of acquisitions due to cross-
transmission during a one-day period (between time tk
and time t k + 1) is β1 Uk Ck + β2 Uk Dk. Each time pointcorresponds to 1 day and n is the total number of study
days. The expected number of acquisitions (both cross-
transmission and background acquisition) is β0 Uk + β1
Uk Ck + β2 Uk Dk. Hence the proportion of VRE colon-
isation/infection acquired via cross-transmission be-







β0Uk þ β1UkCk þ β2UkDk
The effectiveness of active surveillance and subsequent
contact isolation, r, was assessed by estimating the ratio of
transmission rates in patients with contact isolation versus
those without contact isolation, calculated as β2/β1.
Model selection
As shown in Table 1, we evaluated models with back-
ground acquisition rate (β0) (Models 2, 4 and 5) and
models without β0 (Models 1 and 3). Models with β0 sug-
gest that VRE can be acquired sporadically as well as
through patient-to-patient transmission, whereas models
without β0 suggest that VRE can only be acquired through
patient-to-patient transmission. A number of models were
parameterised using combinations of assumed and esti-
mated parameters (Table 1). To help with model selection,
we considered whether the model converged, and the
Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the Akaike informa-
tion criteria (AIC) and Deviance information criterion
(DIC) were calculated. The BIC has been shown to be
suitable for model selection of Bayesian HMMs [34]. It is
based on the trade-off between the model’s goodness-
of-fit and the corresponding complexity of the model [34].
Table 1 Comparison of different models
Model
number
β0 β1 β2 v λ λ2 Convergence achieved
1 Assume β0 = 0 Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated No
2 Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated No
3 Assume β0 = 0 Estimated Estimated Assume v=1 Estimated Assume λ and λ2 related by PD, whereby PD
is 0.775/7
No
4 Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated Assume λ and λ2 related by PD, whereby PD
is 0.775/7
No
5 Estimated Estimated Estimated Assume v=1 Estimated Assume λ and λ2 related by PD, whereby PD
is 0.775/7
Yes
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As the preferred diagnostic for model selection of HMMs
remains unresolved [34], the AIC and DIC previously
shown [18, 35] to be appropriate in this setting were also
calculated. Similar to the BIC, the model with the lower
values of AIC and DIC are preferred [36].
Results
Convergence was not observed in Models 1, 2, 3 and 4.
When assumptions were made on the parameters v, λ
and λ2 (Model 5), model fit improved and convergence
was achieved. Thus Model 5 (where acqusition may be
by cross transmission or via other sources) best fits our
study data. Although we set out to calculate the BIC,
AIC and DIC values of the different models, these values
were not calculated or presented as only Model 5
converged.
We estimated that 6% (2/32) and 3% (1/32) of hidden
(not detected) patients were colonised/infected (―C ) with
VRE at any time point during passive surveillance and ac-
tive surveillance with contact isolation, respectively. Based
on the dataset, 6% (2/32) and 22% (7/32) of patients were
detected to be colonised/infected with VRE (―D ) at any
given time point during passive surveillance and active
surveillance with contact isolation, respectively.
Estimates of the transmission parameters β0, β1, β2,
and λ for Model 5 are in Table 2. Posterior probability
distributions of the estimated parameters are in Fig. 4.Table 2 Estimated model parameters for Model 5
Parameters Symbo
(unit)
Background acquisition coefficient β0 (×10




Cross-transmission coefficient in patients who were contact isolated β2 (×10
contac
Probability of detection for passive surveillance λ
Ratio of VRE transmission with contact isolation versus without
contact isolation
–
Proportion of VRE colonisation/infection that was acquired via
cross-transmission
(%)We estimated that the background acquisition rate (β0)
was 0.0076 (95% credible interval 0.0026 to 0.013). That
is, on average, a susceptible patient will become colo-
nised as a result of background acquisition every 131 pa-
tient days (95% credible interval: 78 to 379 days). The
estimated cross-transmission coefficient without (β1)
and with contact isolation (β2) was 0.00049 (95% cred-
ible interval 4.9 × 10− 6 to 0.0033) and 0.00017 (95%
credible interval 1.2 × 10− 6 to 0.00082), respectively.
That is, based on the numbers of hidden and detected
colonised/infected patients in the study, on average, a
susceptible patient became colonised as a result of
cross-transmission every 758 days (95% credible interval:
121 to 82,234 days) and 622 days (95% credible interval:
117 to 78,312 days) in passive surveillance and active
surveillance with contact isolation, respectively. The ra-
tio of transmission rates in patients with contact isola-
tion versus those without contact isolation (r) was 0.33
(95% credible interval: 0.050 to 1.22). Thus, we esti-
mated lower rates of transmission from patients who
were contact isolated, but there remains significant pos-
sibility that the transmission rates in contact isolation
are not lower. The estimated detection probability dur-
ing passive surveillance (λ) was 0.044 (0.016 to 0.14).
The proportion of VRE colonisation/infection that was
acquired via cross-transmission between patients, p, was
estimated to be 0.31 (95% credible interval: 0.0033 to
0.85) suggesting that the majority of the VRE acquisitionl Median values
(95% credible intervals)
− 4) (/susceptible/day) 76 (26 to 130)
− 4) (/VRE colonised or infected patient that was
ntact isolated/susceptible/day)
4.9 (0.049 to 33)
−4) (/VRE colonised or infected patient that was
t isolated/susceptible/day)
1.7 (0.012 to 82)
0.044 (0.016 to 0.14)
0.33 (0.050 to 1.22)
0.17 (0.0015–0.72)
Fig. 4 Posterior probability density of parameter estimates
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be associated with patient-to-patient transmission.
Discussion
In this study, we have accounted for unobserved VRE
transmission during passive surveillance and statistical de-
pendencies in VRE transmission data. We estimated that
the majority of the VRE acquisition in this haematology-
oncology ward was due to background VRE acquisition,
whereas the proportion of VRE colonisation/infection that
was acquired via cross-transmission between patients was
31% (95% credible interval: 0.33% to 85%). In the
haematology-oncology (study) ward, we estimate that fac-
tors independent of the number of VRE patients account
for 69% of VRE acquisitions. The types of events that lead
to acquisition that is independent of cross-transmission
include endogenous acquisition from antibiotic selection
pressure and VRE in the environment. A major strength
of this study is that, unlike earlier studies using non-
Bayesian methods [7, 8, 10], we inferred the number of
undetected VRE colonisation cases using a HMM frame-
work and Bayesian analysis. Our approach also accounted
for data dependencies; the fact that VRE transmission at a
certain time is dependent on number of VRE colonised
and/or infected patients at an earlier time.
The aim of this study was to assess the pre- and
post-intervention surveillance data to quantify the im-
pact of contact isolation on VRE transmission in the
ward. However due to the low VRE transmission ob-
served throughout the study period, we were unable toassess the effectiveness of contact isolation. Our model
estimated that VRE transmission was reduced in patients
who were contact isolated compared with those in the
open ward (relative infectiousness = 0.33), but the cred-
ible interval for this parameter was wide and crossed
unity. Hence while the effect size is potentially large, we
cannot conclude definitively that active surveillance and
contact isolation reduced transmission. Additional data
including more time points and differing levels of inci-
dence of VRE would allow greater precision of this
estimate.
Even if the effect size is as large as the point estimate
of 0.33, the proportion of acquisitions through this route
is estimated to be only 31%, hence the overall impact is
limited in this setting. Thus infection control measures
such as antimicrobial stewardship, and environmental
cleaning may be more important than VRE detection
and contact isolation in settings where the majority of
VRE transmission was estimated to be due to back-
ground acquisition. This emphasises the need to identify
and address the source of VRE acquisition when imple-
menting measures to prevent VRE acquisition.
Our finding was consistent with a study in another
hospital in Melbourne which found that in a significant
proportion of patients, the vanB transposon was gener-
ated from multiple different events within a patient ra-
ther than cross-transmission from a clonal outbreak
[37]. We may have also observed our results because of
one or more of the following factors: our study was con-
ducted in the non-VRE outbreak setting, we included
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rather than infected patients alone and other infection
control measures were not optimised. Previous studies
that found active surveillance with contact isolation to
be more effective than passive surveillance were con-
ducted in different settings [8, 10], assessed different
study outcomes [7, 9], .and active surveillance with con-
tact isolation was implemented as part of a multiple
strategy intervention [10].
Several assumptions were made in our model. In the ob-
servation model, the Poisson distribution was used to
describe the probability relationship between the observa-
tions and corresponding hidden states. The Poisson distri-
bution was chosen as we utilised incidence data [18].
Limited information is available on the increase in prob-
ability of VRE detection during active surveillance (PD)
and the effectiveness of non-rinse chlorhexidine skin
cleansing (v) on VRE transmission in the haematology-
oncology setting. We allowed for the uncertainties in these
variables by randomly drawing the value of PD from a
beta distribution based on the adjusted values of 0.083
and 0.14 (based on sensitivity of VRE rectal swab between
0.58 [28] and 0.97) [29], and v from a beta distribution of
between 0.06 and 1.59 [38]. As the credible intervals were
wide for β1 and β2, the degree of uncertainty was large.
Thus the estimation of β1 and β2 may not be fully inter-
pretable given the large degree of uncertainty in these pa-
rameters. Although contact isolation has not always been
associated with reductions in VRE transmission [39, 40],
we did not feel that it was plausible that contact isolation
would increase VRE transmission by more than 50%.
Therefore we constrained the ratio of transmission in pa-
tients with contact isolation versus those without contact
isolation (r = β2/β1) to be between 0 and 1.5. A constant
discharge rate was assumed throughout the study imply-
ing an exponential distribution of LOS. As our data
showed that the length of stay distribution was right-
skewed with a long tail and had a mode that was close to
zero, the assumption of a constant discharge rate was
plausible. Given that patients were found to remain colo-
nised with VRE up to a few years after first detection [26,
41], we assumed that VRE colonised/infected patients re-
main so until discharge.
The current model enabled estimation of VRE trans-
mission during our study phases by using actual data on
VRE colonisation and infection; however, we were not
able to consider VRE strain sequencing. The relative
contributions of antibiotic use, compliance with contact
isolation, co-morbidities, and illness severity to the risk
of VRE transmission were not measured and were as-
sumed to be the same for all the study phases. Such fac-
tors could be incorporated into future mathematical
models. Due to the lack of data, we assumed that all
uncolonised patients had the same susceptibility to VREcolonisation/infection. Future models could also incorp-
orate heterogeneity in susceptibility of patients to VRE
colonisation/infection based on certain risk factors in
their analysis. To simplify the model, homogenous mix-
ing of patients within the study wards was assumed.
Whilst the impact of non-homogenous patient mixing
on results can be explored in future studies, the increase
in model complexity and reduced precision associated
with such studies may not be favourable.
Conclusions
This study found that patients who were contact isolated
did not have a significant reduction in VRE transmission
rate compared to those who were not contact isolated
and that most acquisition was not from cross transmis-
sion of VRE in our setting. These findings highlight the
importance of identifying and addressing the source of
VRE acquisition in the implementation of measures to
prevent VRE acquisition. When the majority of VRE ac-
quisition is due to background acquisition, infection
control measures other than active surveillance with
contact isolation (such as antimicrobial stewardship, en-
vironmental cleaning and hand hygiene) need to be
optimised.
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